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Market Wages, Reservation Wages, and
Retirement Decisions
ABSTRACT
The paper is an empirical cross-section of the retirement decisions
of American white men between the ages of 58 and 67, predicated on the
theoretical notion that an individual retires when his reservation wage
exceeds his market wage. Reservation wages are derived from an explicit
utility function in which the most critical taste parameter is assumed
to vary both systematically and randomly across individuals. Market
wages are derived from a standard wage equation adjusted to the special
circumstances of older workers.
The two equations are estimated jointly by maximum likelihood, which
takes into account the potential selectivity bias inherent in the model
(low-wage individuals tend to retire and cease reporting their market
wage). The model is reasonably successful in predicting retirement decisions
and casts serious doubt on previous claims that the social security system
induces many workers to retire earlier than they otherwise would. The normal
effects of aging (on both market and reservation wages) and the incentives
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1. Introduction and preview
Why do people retire? This question is now attracting
. increasing attention because of recent and proposed changes
in the minimum age of mandatory retirement and because of the
likelihood that the social security system will be in need of
major structural overhaul in the coming years. It is clear that
labor force participation rates among older men are declining
quite rapidly. The reasons behind this trend are less clear.
We can enumerate five basic classes of reasons why older
people retire from the labor force. First, failing health in
old age may make work much more difficult, or less remunerative
if wages decline as a result of ill health. Second, advancing
1 d d h 1 h · t . 1 age may pul wages ownwar even w en hea t ~s no an ~ssue.
Third;-it has been suggested that the social security system
sets up powerful incentives.that induce people to retire earlier
than they otherwise would.2 Fourth, private pension arrangements
may offer similar financial incentives for retirement. Fifth,
as people age their preferences may shift in favor of leisure
and against work. Our purpose in this paper is to estimate the
relative importance of each of these competing hypotheses--
health, wages, social security, private pensions, and tastes--
in explaining retirement decisions, and to see which (if any)
lThat is, even for individuals whose health is average
for their age.
2See, for example, Boskin (1977), Boskin and Hurd (1978),
Burkhauser (1977), Burkhauser and Turner (1978). This list
could easily be extended.· I
2.
can explain the trend toward earlier retirement.
Healhh= It is by now well documented that, when retirees
are asked to explain their actions, ill health is the most common
explanation of retirement.3 Our estimates find a substantia1,
though not overwhelming, effect of ill health. However, effects
of health on retirement age will not explain the trend in
retirement age since health improvements over time would imply
an increase, not a decrease, in retirement ages.
Wages. When or if an individual chooses to retire depends
critically on the life-cycle pattern of wages.4 There is some
controversy in the human capital literature over whether age
~~ ~ has a depressing effect on wages. By using an econometric
co~rection for selectivity bias, we uncover evidence here that
it does~ But a concave age-wage profile can explain an
increasi~propensity to retire only if it shifts in a manner
tentative
that is unfavorable to older workers. We find/evidence that
this has happened, too.
Social Security. The net wage late in life can decline
either because the q~ wage falls (as just suggested) or
because the tax-and-transfer wedge between gross and net wages
increases. Many people have thought that the social security
system--and particularly the earnings test--causes such an effect
by placing a heavy tax on work effort late in life. We doubt
that this explanation of retirement makes sense, and have designed
our research program accordingly. The reasons for our skepticism
'For a summary, see Campbell and Campbell (1976).3·
merit some explanation.'
Many observers have pointed out that the social security
law creates a complex multi-armed budget constraint for eligible
individuals.6 Though labor supply decisions are distorted by
social security, perhaps substantially, it is most unlikely that
social security sets up strong incentives to reti~--that is, to
reduce hours of work to zero--because:
1. a small amount of earnings (currently %3,000 per year)
is allowed before the earnings test is applied. Hence, in the
neighborhood of zero hours of work, the marginal tax rate
<
implicit in the social security system is zero.
2. current earnings have a potentially important effect on
future social securi~y benefits. We have shown elsewhere that
under plausible circumstances this effect can amount to approxi-
mately a 50% wage subsidy and might well discourage people
from retiring..(Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980a»
3. individuals who opt not to begin collecting social security
benefits at age 62 earn an upward adjustment in their potential
benefits at age 65 that often provides more than actuarially fair
compensation. (Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980a)•.')
Consequently, we decided to concentrate our initial efforts
on reti~ment decisions, not labor suool~ decisions in general,
leaving the more difficult, but worthwhile, extension to hours
of work to future" research.7 Our basic model of retirement
5For a much fuller treatment of this issue, see Blinder,
Gordon, and Wise (1980a).
6Boskin and Hurd (1978), Hanoch and Honig (1978), and
others.
7For a preliminary attempt, see Blinder, Gordon, and Wise
(1978), Chapter VI. We are far from satisfied with the results.,,
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assumes that social security is irrelevant to retirement decisions.
As a check on this, however, we append a few variables designed
to "pick up" any social_ security effects that may have been
overlooked. In general, these variables achieve statistical
significance, but are of little empirical importance.
It hardly needs pointing out that if social security has
little effect on retirement decisions, the growth of the social
security system cannot explain the ~rend toward retirement--
frequent claims to the contrary notwithstanding.
Private Pensions. The story is rather different, however,
when we consider private pensions.8 First of all, many private
pension plans include a provision for mandatory retirement at
a prescribed age [Skolnik (1976)]. In such cases, the incentive
to refire is fairly obvious: -a compulsory change in jobs may
occasion a loss of wages so severe that the worker prefers to
retire rather than take a job at a much reduced wage. One goal
of our model is to estimate this wage loss, and we find it to
be very substantial.
The effect of private pensions in the absence of mandatory
retirement is more subtle, but may be quite powerful nonetheless.
Once the age of eligibility for the pension arrives,.a worker
who continues to work reduces the discounted present value of
his pension benefits if he remains on the job because his future
8For more details on these matters, see Blinder, Gordon,
and Wise (1978), especially Chapters I and II.5·
annual rate of benefits is rarely adjusted upward. Thus if w
is his annual wage and b is his annual pension benefit, the
marginal return to a year of work drops from w to w-b at
the age of eligibility for the pension. Furthermore, many
private pension plans create a bonus for early retirement by
failing to adjust the annual pension benefit downward by the full
actuarial amount if the worker elects to retire early.9 Our
estimates suggest a 'very strong effect of a private pension on
the retirement decision. Since private pension plans have
grown so explosively during the postwar period, this factor can
h 1 t f th ' 1 f t' 10 e p accoun or e grow~ng preva ence 0 re ~rees.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section
discusses our theoretical model of retirement decisions, and the
following section briefly describes the data source and estimation
technique. Sections 4 and 5; the heart of the paper, flesh
out the details of our precise econometric specifications of a
market wage equation and a reservation wage equation respectively,
and also present and interpret the estimated coefficients. The
model, however, is sufficiently nonlinear and complicated that
the coefficient estimates do not "speak for themselves." Thus
Section 6 is devoted to analyzing the implications of our
estimates for retirement decisions. Section 7 concludes the
9see Skolnik (1976), especially pp. 8-9.
lOIn a broad sense, these effects of private pensions can
perhaps be considered indirect effects of social security since
it is probably the social security system that singled out age
65 as the standard age for pension eligibility and/or mandatory
retirement.6
pape~ with some brief remarks on why people retire.
~ A Model of the Retirement Decision
If we are to model retirement decisions, we must first
settle on a definition of retirement--a concept that is not
nearly so unambiguous as it may sound. In this paper, we define
retirement ~n .the most straightforward possible way: as zero
hours of work for money•. We note, however, that some other
I
authors have preferred alternative definitions.ll
Our model of retirement is simple. Indifference curves
between leisure and income s~ift naturally over time due to the
aging process, and also due to changes in health. Similarly,
the market wage changes over time because of age, experience,
and 6tner reasons. At some point for some people there comes
an age (the age of retirement) at which the highest indifference
curve is reached at a corner solution with zero hours of work,
as depicted in Figure 1. Notice in Figure 1 that the shape of
the budget line far away from zero hours of work probably has
. h t . d·· 12 th h·t h no bear1ng on t e re 1rement eC1s10n, oug 1 may ave a
crucial bearing on the choice of optimal hours for those who
are not retired.
Ilsee, for example, Boskin (1977) or Reimers (1977).
12There is one important exception to this. If the budget
set is extremely convex--for example because current earnings
have a large positive effect on future social security benefits--
the shape of the budget line at high hours of work could influence
the retirement decisions of some people. This effect would
induce these people to stay in the labor force, not to retire.
For more on this, see Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980a ).1.
To express these simple intuitive notions in a way that
lends itself to econometric work, let the market wage available
to individual i at date t be described by a "wage equation"
of the form:
(1)
where w is the wage, X is a vector of characteristics relevant
to wages, - ~ is a vector of coefficients in the wage equation,
and € is a normally distributed error term.13
To derive the reservation wage, consider the following
utility maximization model of labor-leisure choice. Each
individual lives for three periods: the "Past," the "present,"
and the "future." These will be denoted periods 0, 1, and 2
respectively, and assumed to have lengths (measured in years)
TO ' I, and T2 • Letting Ci denote consumption in the three
periods (bequests are ignored, but can easily be allowed for)
and L. denote the fraction of each period spent at leisure,
1.
the utility function to be maximized is assumed to be:
where and are subjective discount factors. Ignoring
human capital formation and assuming perfect capital markets,
the only relevant constraint is the lifetime budget constraint:
130ur precise specification of the function f(·) will
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F ~ A + E w.T.d. = "full income" ··a.. . 1 1 1 1 ' 1=
the first-order conditions for a maximum can be written:
3
E d.T.(C. + w.L.) = F
i=l 1 1 1 1 1
(the budget constraint)
U' (Ci ) = AfJ. (optimal consumption choices) (4) 1
V' (Li ) = Aw. fJ . if a < L. < :J, (5a) 1 1 1 -
V'Cl' ) > Aw. fJ. if L. = 1 (optimal
(5b) 1 1 1 leisure
choices)
v'(a) < Aw. fJ . if L. = a . (5C) 1 1 1'.
10.
We assume here that consumption is always at an interior solution,
but must consider corner solutions for leisure more carefully.
To make headway toward an econometric specification, we
d th f 11 - t- 1 -l't f t- 14 a opt e 0 owJ.ng par J.cu ar utJ. J. y unc J.ons:
C- 1-8
V(Ci ) J. = 1-8
L. 1-8
V(Li) ;- J. = 1-8 , J.
(6)
where the age-specific taste parameters ;i are our way of
incorpor~ting systematic changes in preferences toward leisure
as an individual ages. Since prime-age men have been observed
to supply labor very inelastically, we further assume that ;0
is appr~ximately zero, so that labor supply in period 0 is
inelastic at TO (i.e., LO = 0 in accord with (5c)).
We are interested in the Ll decision and, in particular,
whether or not LIWill be less than unity. Since the result
differs somewhat depending on whether or not the individual
assumes he will be retired in period 2, we.present here the
reservation wage for period 1 under the assumption that the
individual will be retired in period 2.15 Assuming L2 = 1
14pollak (1971) proves that a minor generalization of this
is the most general class of additively separable utility
functions leading to demand functions that are linear in income.
This form is widely used in both theoretical and empirical work
on a variety of subjects.
15rhe- nextl)two- ·footnotes : dea1 with the case in which
the individual will not be retired in period 2.11.
and using (4)-(7) and the budget constraint (3), we can solve
for consumption and leisure in all three periods. The resulting
demand for is:
where 1 --
J.L' _ (e.) 5
1 1
The reservation wage, denoted
that makes
w~ is defined as the value of
to unity. A little algebraic
manipulation shows this to be given by:
Each of the terms in (9) merits consideration. The first
term is basically a constant.16 The second term is a taste
variable which will be modelled more explicitly below. The
third term captures the typical intertemporal tradeoff found
165 'f' 11' , d l'f t' 'th t t pec1 1ca y, 1n an n-per10 1 e 1me, W1 . cons an
interest rate r and constant time discount rate P, 0 would be:
1 n-l --
" 1:" [(l+p)t] 5
'0· l+r 1;.0· .
If the individual will not be retired" in period 2, the f?llowing
term must be added to 0:1 w --
w2 T2d2 J.L2 ( ~) 5
For plausible parameter values, and our estimated value of 5 ,
this term is less than 0.01, so ignoring it is inconsequential.12.
in all life-cycle models. Written out explicitly, it is:
The interpretation is clearest if the annual interest and time
discount rates are approximately constant and equal to rand p
respectively, for then this term is (r-p)A, where A is age.
If p is low (high) relative to r, the individual prefers to
(work) .
postpone leisurE{, i.e., the r.eservation\'Bge rises (falls) with
age. The final term in (9) is "full income" in past years.17
Statistically identical individuals, however, make different
labor-leisure choices (or, in this context, have different
reservation wages), presumably because they have different tastes.
So it seems important, in the stochastic specification of the
moder;--·,-to .allow for individua1 differences in tastes. Though
the utility function we hav~ used has five taste parameters,
it is clear that where retirement decisions are concerned the
parameter of greatest economic significance is ~l' the weight
on current-period leisure in equation (7). So, for empirical
purposes, this is the one we a llow to vary across individual,
viz. :
l7I £ the individual will work in· period 2, then w2d2T2
must be included in the "full income" concept.where ~i is a normally distributed random variable. In the
empirical work, loggi is taken to be a linear function of a
number of observable variables (age, health, etc.) so we can
write (9) as:
R log w. = Z. Y + ~. ,
~ ~ ~ (10)
for the reservation wage, the model of retirement described in
words and qepicted in Figure 1 can be stated algebraically as
follows:
Individual i will be retired or working according as:
R >
log Wi < log Wi
or
> Z.Y + ~. = f(X.,t3) + E· •
~. ~ < ~ ~
ell)
It will be noted that our approach to deriving condition
(11) as a model of retirement is strikingly similar to the method
introduced by Heckman (1974) for dealing with selectivity bias
in another context. The application of Heckman's analysis to
our problem is quite clear. Individuals who happen to draw
low values of E. will decide to retire, and hence we will not
~
observe their wages. This suggests, for example, that the effects14.
of age on wages as estimated from the working population will
be biased ~ard by sample selection because it will be mostly
those with favorable drawings of €i that actually get into
the sample. Thus, in addition to providing an empirical model
of the retirement decision, the model we estimate here offers
the side benefit of providing estimates of a standard wage
equation like (1) that are not afflicted by selectivity bias.
Selectivity bias corrections turn out to be sizeable in some
cases.
3. Data and Method of Estimation
The data used to estimate the model were drawn from the
first three waves (1969, 1971, and 1973) of the Longitudinal
Retirement History Survey (LRHS). This survey conducted
extraordinarily detailed interviews of 11,153 individuals aged
58-63 in 1969, and repeated the interviews at two-year intervals
for those individuals who survived and could be located. In
each survey year, individuals were asked a variety of questions
(wage rate, typical hours, ,eligibility for pension, etc.) about
their current job, if they had one. In addition, the 1969
interview included questions about their previous job--which
would have been their last job if they were already retired,
and about a number of socioeconomic variables that would not
change through time (e.g., family background, education).
From these data we extracted a sample of white males who
were not self employed and who worked for pay at least sometime in their lives as our basic sampling frame. certain other
exclusions were forced upon us by the data. For example, since
a principal focus of the wage equation was to estimate separately
the returns to prio~ experience and tenure on the current job,
a respondent who did not report his job tenure, and for whom
18 this information could not be deduced, was dropped from the
sample. Secondly, ~espondents were free to report wages for
any time period they chose (e.g., hourly, weekly, monthly). We
converted each response into an hourly wage and expressed each
in 1969 dollars. However, whenever the reported information was
inadequate to construct the hourly wage rate, or was clearly
erroneous,19 the observation was dropped from the sample. with
f · t' . 20 . . . a ew m1nor excep 10ns, we 1mputed all other m1ss1ng data as
best we could rather than censor the sample. On balance, of
l8For example, if job tenure was unknown in 1969, but
reported as 25 years in 1971, we assumed it was 23 years in 1969.
19Reported wage rates above ~50 per hour (or ~100 per hour
in the case of managers and professional workers) or below one
third of the average wage rate in manufacturing (which was ~1.06
in 1969)" were considered erroneous.
20There were a few case~ in which there was not adequate
information on the lifetime pattern of job holdings to construct
the measure of "full income" needed for equation (9). In a few
other cases, the reported data implied what to us was an
implausibly long hiatus between the end of schooling (or, more
accurately, years of education plus 6) and the start of the
first full time job. When this gap was greater than 15 years,
we dropped the observation from the sample.16.
our·original potential sample of 7,420 white males in 1969, we
lost 258 individuals in all three years because of an inability
to construct permanent -income: dropped 143 retirees because they
did not report their job tenure on their last job: and dropped
1,789 observations in 1969, 1,308 observations in 1971, and
1,625 observations in 1973 because of missing data on wage rate
or job tenure. In addition, there was some sample
attrition due to death or inability to locate the individual
for re-interview. After all these deletions, however, we were
still left with a sample If 15,981 observations, of which 9,879
were workers and 6,102 were retirees.
Estimation was by maximum likelihood. Log(wi ) is stochastic





1. TJi . We assumed that €. and
1. TJ· were 1.
TJ. = p€. + V.
1. 1. 1. , (12 )
where €.
1. and v.
. 1. are independent normal variables. Given
any set of estimates of all the parameters, the model implies
both a density for the market wage and a probability that the
individual will be retired(conditional on his wage.~ jf it
is observed)'-
• ·1 • The data tell us which people are retired,
and the actual wages for those who are working. The parameters
were chosen to maximize the likelihood of obtaining the sample.2l
21 .
Details on the precise likelihood function are provided
in the appendix.17·
4. The Market Wage Equation
Our market wage equation:
log w· = f(X.,f3) + E·
1. 1. 1. (1)
is rather complicated, and can best be understood if its
objectives are made clear at the outset. They were:
(1) To examine in some detail the effects of aging on
wages, seeking to untangle the interrelated effects of age,
vintage, and experience, since each of these might be relevant
to retirement decisions.
(2) To investigate the effects of pensions and pension-
related job provisions (such as mandatory retirement) on wages.
As mentioned in the introduction, job transitions late in life
induced either by mandatory retirement or by pensions may imply
a substantial loss of earning power if job tenure (henceforth, j')
is more valuable than previous experience on other jobs (henceforth,
x). A sharp drop in wages, in turn, might induce retirement.
(3) To measure the loss in market wages from job transitions
late in life that stem from reasons other than pensions (e.g.,
from a desire to reduce hours of work). This requires us not
only to separate out the effects of job tenure from those of
previous exper~ence, but also to disaggregate by occupation
group since there is every reason to believe that the cost of
a job transition varies by occupat~on.18.
Previous Experience and Job Tenure
The nonlinear par~ of (1) deals with the effects of
experience on wages, which the work of Mincer (1974) and others
has taught us is nonlinear. The need to (a) separate the
effects of j from those of x and (b) disaggregate by occupation
led us to adopt a rather parsimonious functional form that
nonetheless allowed for dim~nishing returns to experience. We
selected as our basic specification:
log w = t30k + CXklog( j+bkx) ,
where the subscript k indicates that these coefficients vary
by occupation. If bk = 1, then only the sum j+x matters--as
in the conventional specification of wage equations. To the
extent, however, that previous experience is less valuable than
experience on the current job, bk will be less than unity.
(In our estimates, all of the b's turned out to be substantially
less than unity.) Supposing that all the a's and b's turn out
to be positive (as they do), the specification implies positive
but diminishing returns to both j and x, and a negative
interaction term, i.e., as job tenure increases, the value of
previous experience decreases. These properties seem reasonable
on ~ PKiori grounds to us--more reasonable, e.g., than assuming
no interaction between j and x.
This basic specification was extended in three ways in
order to implement the objectives listed above. First, we
allowed both the basic wage-experience profile and the relative
returns of j versus x to differ between jobs with or without
pensions. Second, we allowed a change in occupation to "devalue"19.
one's previous experience. Third, we recognized that in jobs
with pensions some part of hourly compensation is deferred, and
that workers might not value pension- contributions equally with
straight wages. These led .to the following amendments to
our basic specification:
where p is (our estimate of) the hourly pension contribution
. 22
made by the employer, DP is a dummy equal to one for workers
with pensions, and DO is a dummy equal to one for workers who
are currently in an occupation different from that of their
longest job. The parameter A indicates the weight given to
pension contributions relative to straight wages. We expect
o < A < 1, ~3 ~ 0, but have no particular supposition about ~l •
The choice of occupational groupings was meant to balance
our desire to obtain disaggregated information against our fear
of letting an already awesome computational problem become entirely
unmanageable. Since each occupational group leads to three new
parameters, as can be seen in (13), we decided to limit ourselves
to the following four occupational groupings:
Occupation Group 1: Professionals and technical workers;
Managers, Officials, and proprietors.
22The construction of p was quite complicated, owing to
certain shortcomings in the data. Details are available on
request.20.
Occupation Group 2: Salesmen: Clerical workers.
Occupation Group ;: Craftsmen, Operatives, Private
household workers, Service workers.
Occupation Group 4: Nonfarm laborers, Farm managers, Farm
laborers, Occupation unknown.
The occupation groups were chosen for their inherent similarity
and can be loosely thought of as "high class" white collar,
"low class" white collar, skilled blue collar, and unskilled
blue collar.
Estimates of the parameters just discussed appear in the
top portion of Table 1, which reports estimates of all the
parameters of the likelihood function that pertain to the market
wage•. The reader is reminded, however, that the market and
reservation wage equations were estimated jointly. This was
necessary because ~ the estimated market wage equation
would otherwise be atflicted by selectivity bias.
The estimates contain a number of interesting results.
First, returns to experience (the ak in equation (13» turned
out to differ surprisingly little across occupations. The
estimates imply that the marginal returns to an additional year
of job tenure (j) are quite low for older workers. If j = 20
and x = 25, which are typical figures in our sample, the
marginal returns to an additional year of tenure on the jab range
between 0.6610 and 0.83 10 , depending on occupation. Even in21.
an extreme case like j = 5, x = 40, the range is only from
1.11'10 to 2.17'70 per year. As we expect, professiona:Isand
m~nqgers reap the greatest returns from job tenure and laborers
the +ea~t.
There is more variation across occupations in the returns
to previous experience. But, more importantly, we see very low
returns to previous experience in all occupations. The weight
attached to x in the weighted sum j + bx ranges from .07 to
.28 if there has not been a change in occupation, and from .03
to .24 if there has been. Marginal returns to an additional
year of previous experience apparently are trivial for older
workers.
The tremendous effect that having a pension has on the job
tenure profile is of particular interest because of its importance
for retirement decisions. As can be seen in (16), we allowed
the existence of a pension to affect both the intercept and the
slope of the wage-tenure profile. Specifically, for jObs
without pensions equation (13) becomes:
log w = ~Ok + ak log[j + ~2kx],
while for jobs with pensions it becomes:
(l3b)
Given our parameter estimates, wages are systematically higher
on jobs with pensions, though the amount by which they are
higher varies both by occupation and according to the mix of
job tenure and prior experience. The wage differential between
jobs with and without pensions is greatest when j is small
; l .. "f r'; .22.
relative to x, and diminishes as j rises relative to x.23
It seems clear that the pension dummy is "picking up" some
unmeasured attribute that pays off in the form of higher wages;
among the possibilities are abi~ity, reliability, some unmeasured
t f h 't 1 ' h' 24 aspec 0 uman cap~ a , or even the returns to un~on members ~p.
An important question to ask, given our interest in retire-
ment decisions, is: what does it cost an older worker to change
jobs late in his career (perhaps because he wants to step down
to a job with shorter hours)? To answer this, we assume first
that he has no pension on either job, so the issue is merely
one of swapping· j for x. Table 2 displays the effect on
wages of giving up a job on which the worker has either 45,
20, or 10 years of experience in order to take a new job (with
j = 0, x = 45). The losses are typically quite substantial.25
23For example, the different~al is 82 '70 when j =0 and
x=45, faIls to between 35 '10 and 54 '10 (depending on occupation)
when j=15 and x=45, and to 20% - 33 10 when j=30 and x=15.
240ur data did not tell us which individuals were union
members, and it is well known that pensions are more common
in the unionized sector.
25The calculation is based on comparing the value of
exp[aklog(j+~2kx)] when j and x are as indicated in the
table with exp[aklog(45~2k)].TABLE :1
























































.066 C. 016) -·,4.9 'b
.147 C. 034) ~'20 b
.106 C. 022) .699 b
.281 C. 035 ) .:575 b
';'·.040 ( .009) -·591 ·b
Pension slope (~1) -.947 (.olld -.20) b
Pension intercept(~4) .601 (.021) .269 ( .017 )
.Government pension -.116 ( .020) ~ .097 ,( .017 )
. dummy (GP)
Private Pension -.033 ( .0].6) -.014 ( .013)
dummy ( pp)
Age Variables,
AGE - 61 -.026 ( .003) .00) ( .005)
.AGE times blue
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Slope 1-8 years .029
Slope 9-12 years .032
Jump for high school
diploma .015
Slope beyond 12 years .045
















Number of observations 15,931
not reporting wages 6,102
log 1ikeiihoodc -11,756.6









a In the OLS regression, the"nonlinear terms had to be approximated
linearly. See, for exalllple,. footnote 29.
bSince the reported coefficients here are ratios of estimated
coefficients, we do not report a standard error.
cFor the full equation, including retirees.Workers with even moderate amounts of job tenure (10 years)
lose a lot by changing jObs--except for workers in occupation
group 4 (unskilled laborers).
Next we consider the wage loss from leaving a job with a
pension. If the new job has no pension, then the wage loss is
t d T bl 'd' t 26 S h . b t 't' remen ous, as a e 3 ~n ~ca es. uc a)o rans~ ~on
entails both a loss of the benefits from being on a pensioned
job and substantial devaluation of one's previous experience.
By contrast, however, there is no wage loss (in fact, a slight
gain) if the new job has a pension.
On balance, the typical wage loss from a job transition
late in life appears to be quite severe. It is doubtful, therefore,
\
that many older workers will want to make such transitions
voluntarily. Loss of a job through unemploYment, mandatory
retirement, or a temporary bout of ill health, may well induce
a worker to retire rather than change jobs late in life.
Value of Pension contributbns
As already noted, an estimate of the hourly pension
contribution was included'in the lefthand side of (13), multiplied
by a weight ,,-.27
260f course, to the extent that our pension dummy is pickin~
up unmeasured individua1 traits that are portable (e.g. ~ ability)
workers will not actually experience such a large wage loss.
27unfortunately, in about half of the observations with
pensions the information needed 'to construct p was missing.
Our approach to this problem, led to the inclusion of two dummy
variables:
GP = dummy equal to 1 for a government job with a pension
whose benefits are unknown
(continued)TABLS 2
Percentage Loss of Wages from Job Transition
when Neither Job Has a Pension
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The point estimate of ~ suggests that ~l contributed to a
pension fund is worth about 52¢ in direct compensation. This
is rather lower than might be'expected, but it must be remembered
that some of these pensions were not vested and others were not
funded very soundly. In addition, our rough approximation to
the variable p (the average pension contribution per hour over
the life of the job) may be a poor approximation to the marginal
contribution rate--suggesting downward bias from measurement
error. This bias may be aggravated further by potential endogeneity
ofp(i.e., a positive correlation of p with €).
Age Variables
As noted earlier, the pure effect of aging on wage rates
is of some importance for explaining why people retire. Furthermore,
there is some controversy in the human capital literature over
..(footnote 27 continued)
PP = dummy equal to 1 for a prIvate job with a pension,
whose benefits are unknown.
The rationale is as follows. Consider the lefthand side of
(13) as a function of ~. Expanding it to find the Taylor
series approximation around ~ = 0 gives:
log(w+~p) ::: logw + 12. P- • w
For people with unknown p, we set p=O on the lefthand side of
(13) and entered instead a dummy variable on the righthand side
whose ,coefficient is to be interpreted (with sign reversed)
as an estimate of the ratio of p-pJw in these jobs. Since we
know that this ratio is typically much greater in government
jobs than in private-sector jobs, we entered the two
dummy variables defined above.29·
whether there is such an effect, once schooling and experience
are controlled for. If there is a direct'effect of age on wages,
it seems most likely to show up among older workers. We tested
for it by including ,the following two variables:
AGE - 61 = age minus 61 if positive
o otherwise
AGEBC = age 'minus 58 for blue collar workers (groups
3 and h. above)
o for white collar workers
The parameter estimates in Table 1 do indeed suggest an
effect of age ~~~ on wages. Specifically, we estimate a
typical decline in real wages of about 2.6 percent per year
starting at age 61 for white collar workers, and a decline of
about 1.7 percent per year between ages 58 and 61 rising to about
h..3 percent per year after age 61 for blue collar workers. Since
these numbers are much larger than the estimated returns to job
tenure at these ages, real wages typically will be falling after
age 61, and this wiIl provide some inducement to retire.
One further aging variable was included to try to gain some
understanding of the mandatory retirement phenomenon. It seemed
to us that the existence of mandatory retirement must imply
that--for somereason--wages diverge from marginal productivity
late in life, and that firms have a need to terminate this
, 1" b'd ft . t 28 V' . th t f th 1.mp 1.C1.t su s 1. y a er some po1.n • 1.ew1.ng e res a e
28See Lazear (1980) for some rationalizations for this
phenomenon.30.
equation as measuring marginal productivity, we inciuded the
following variable to measure the gap between marginal products
and wages:
YEARSMR = 10 minus the number of year$. until mandatory
rEltirement if this number i.;spositive, and if
the job has mandatory retirement .,
= 0 otherwise
For workers on'jobswith mandatory retirement, this variable
begins at 1 nine years before retirement and grows linearly to
10 just befpre retirement. A positive coefficient would therefore
indicate that such workers are increasingly "overpaidnr~lative
to their marginal products, and hence would provide a rationale;,
for manda.toryretirement.
Though thElestimated coefficient is positive, and its
lit rattb-rt is moderately respectable, we cannot consider this
variable to be successful in .expla,ining mandatory retirement
because of its small size--aboutbrte-third of a percent per year.
A substantial gap between wages and,<our proxy for) marginal
products late in life for jobs with mandatory;etirementdoes
not appear in these data.
HeaIth v~:riable~
Three dummy variables for poor health were included:
HS = a dummy equal to 1"1£ there is a short-term health
.problem that limits api;lity to work
, .
HL = a dummy equal to 1 if there is a long-term health
problem ·that limits abi].ity to work
HJ = a dummy equal to 1 if the workerle1:t his last jOb
for health reasons
The estimated coefficients of· these variables merit some
comments. A health limitation on the ability to work seems to31.
account for about a 10 percent drop in wages whether it was
acquired recently or long ago. However, the estimated coefficient
of "left last job for health reasons" is huge--toohuge, in
fact, to be believed. The data show vividly that almost all
individuals who reported leaving their last job for health
reasons are now retired. Very few, therefore, report a wage
rate that can be used to infer the negative effect of this
variable on market wages. The role of the coeffiQient of HJ
in the equation;is to ensure that persons with HJ =1 have an
expected wage so low that they are virtually certain to be retired.
Frankly, we wonder if some people who wanted to retire for other
reasons simply found "left last job for health reasons" to be
a socially acceptable rationale for retirement.
Vintaqe-LBirth Cohort)
As noted in the introduction, one possible explanation for
the trend in retirement is that older workers did not share
equally in the overall productivity growth of the economy. We
were able to test this hypothesis for the 1969-1973 period
since our longitudinal sample made it possible to separate the
effects of age and experience from those of vintage, which we
defined as:
VINTAGE = age in 1969, minus 57.
This variable ran from 1 for the youngest cohort (those born in
1911) to 6 for the oldest (born in 1906).
The coefficient of the vintage variable turned out to be
almost zero--far short of the economy-wide average rate of32.
increase of real wages between 1969 and 1973, tVhich was 1.6~o
per annum. Thus it seems that product':i.v:itygrowth during this
short time span was not neutral across vintages,and in fact
shifted the age-wage profile in a way that was unfavorable to
older workers.
."
The last two columns in Table 1 are included for econometricians
interested in the value of our correction for selectivity bias.
They showthe point estimates (and standard errors) from a linear
ordinary least squares version of our wage equation., run on a
data set consisting only of the 9,879 workers.. (Some of the
parameters are not directly comparable because the nonlinear
aspects of our wage equation were approximated linearly.29 )
The main coefficients of interest are those pertaining to aging,
since this is a principal determinant of labor force
participation. It can be seen that the age coefficients in
ordinary least squares suggested no direct effect of aging on
wages for white collar workers, and a very small negative effect
for blue collar workers. By contrast, our corrected estimates
show wages falling significantly with age. Another interesting
comparison is of the two vintage'effects: roughly 1 percent
per year in the OLS regression, but zero in the corrected
regression. The coefficient of short term (but not long term)
29Por example, the basic specification 10g(w+A.p) = alog( j +bx)
was approximated by setting A. to its estimated value and
expanding the righthand side in a Taylor series around b=l
to get:
alog(j+x) + a(b-1) 7
X + •
J x33.
health problems also appears to have been plagued by serious
selectivity bias in OLS.
5. The Reservation Wage Eguation
As noted in Section 2, the reservation wage equation takes
the form:
(10)
where Z. includes age, variables relevant to labor-leisure
J.
. 30 tastes, and the log of lifetime discounted potential earnings.
Estimation results for the reservation wage function are shown
in Table 4.31
Full Income
When (10) is estimated, the coefficient of logY is our
estimate of 5, the elasticity parameter in the utility function
(see equation (9). It can be seen that full income does indeed
get the expected positive coefficient. However, the coefficient
of .10 is surprisingly low. Since the variable is logY,
30TO avoid an obvious simUltaneity problem, in constructing Y
we used a least squares estimate of each individual's lifetime
earnings, rather than his actual earnings. This estimate was
based on ~ linear wage equation similar to that in Table 1, which
was used to forecast and backcast wages. (For more details on
the procedure, see Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980b).)
According to the tpeoretical derivation in Section 2, Y
ought to include only potential earnings in past years if the
individual will be retired in "the future," but should include
future potential earnings as well if he will not be retired. As
an empirical compromise between these two notions, we assumed
full-time work (2,000 hours per year) until· age 67, and complete
retirement thereafter.
3l The r~ader is again reminded that these estimates come
from the same maximum likelihood estimation problem as those
in Table 1.TABLE 4"
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a rise of 1.0 represents a huge increase in lifetime income,
and yet increases
R w by only about 10 percent.
This low coefficient has two principle implications.
First, since the estimated income effects on labor supply are
so weak, it seems unlikely that rising average income levels
have been a major cause of the trend toward earlier retirement.
Second, since the estimated indifference curves between labor
and leisure are so flat, the implied labor supply function should
be highly elastic to wage rates. This implication is not as
unrealistic as it may seem. It implies, in essence, that the
typical worker will work full time inelastically
until he nears retirement, then a brief period of extreme
sensitivity will ensue, followed by complete withdrawal from the
work force. In fact, this is what the data seem to show. In
1973, when our sample ranged in "age from 62 to 67, 60io worked
zero hours while 34'10 worked 35 hours per week or more ..
Note finally that, in conjunction with our earli.er finding
of substantial wage loss from job transitions late in life,
these flat indifference curves suggest that few workers will
make such transitions. They will opt for retirement instead.
~e Effects
We entered age in a piecewise linear: form with changes in
slope at ages 62 and 65 and a finite jump at age 65, an age
chosen to reflect eligibility for full social security benefits.3~
32The effect of age on logwR includes both the effect of
age on the taste for leisure (~i) and the difference between the
rates of interest and time discount.For reasons explained in Section 1, we did not expect any
particular effect of social security on retirement. Despite
this, a finding that there is either a jump in the reservation
wage at age 65 or a sharp increase in slope at age 62 might be
grounds to suspect that social security really matters after
all--perhaps only because of a demonstration effect.
The estimated age effects on logwR proved to be substantial,
and in the anticipated direction: the reservation wage rises
with age. More specifically, the reservation wage grows at
roughly 4 percent per year from age 58 to 65, makes a finite
jump of about 6 percent at age 65, and then grows at about 6
percent per year after age 65. There are several interesting
observations to be made about this set of coefficients.
'First, while we allowed for it, there is no apparent break
in the reservation wage trend at age 62, the age of eligibility
for partial social security benefits. This is as we expected.
Second, there is however a noticeable (though small) jump at
age 65, the age of full eligibility. This provides some weak
evidence (the standard error is almost half as large as the
coefficient) that social security may be having some effects.
Third, the rate of increase of the reservation wage with
age (4-6 percent per year) is moderately higher than the rate
of decrease of the market wage (about 2.6 percent after age 61)--
indicating that increasing tastes for leisure are somewhat more
important than falling wages in explaining retirement behavior.37.
More on Social Security
To test further for possible effects of social security on
retirement decisions, ~e added to our equation the ratio of
potential social security wealth (i.e., the discounted present
value of potential social security benefits) to full income
called SSW/Yo
The rationale for a variable like this one is as follows.
It could be that many older workers want to retire, but are
deterred because a substantial fraction of their wealth is
tied up in a highly illiquid form--social security wealth. When
they reach age 62, it becomes possible for them to draw on this
wealth, and they consequently retire.33 If this scenario is
empirically important, the ratio of SSw/y should enter the
reservation wage equation strongly and positively after age 62,
but should get a negative sign before age 62. Consequently,
we interacted SSw/y with a dummy variable for those 62 and older,
and entered the two variables indicated in Table 4.
To construct ,SSW/Y, it was necessary to supplement our
data source with information from each individual's social
security file--information that was available from ~he 1975 wave
of the LRHS. However, because of potential endogeneity problems,
we did not use the actual ssw of each person, but rather an
33This hypothesis was suggested to us by several readers
of the earlier draft of this paper.38.
instrument constructed by assuming a fixed age-hours profile.34
This made each individual's SSwjy ratio independent of his
particular labor-leisure choices.
Qualitatively, the results gave little indication that
the illiquidity of social security wealth influences retirement
decisions very much. Prior to age 62, social security wealth
is totally insignificant (and incorrectly signed). After age
62, its coefficient is significantly positive, but economically
unimportant. A typical value for SSwjY is about .07, with
most people clustered in a range from .05 to .12. An increase
of .01 in this variable thus represents a substantial boost in
social security benefits. Yet it adds only 0.3% to the
reservation wage according to the estimate.
Since blue collar work has an element of physical arduousness
that is mostly absent from white collar work, it seemed a
plausible conjecture that reservation wages rise more steeply
for blue collar workers than for white collar workers. To test
34Inparticular, we normally took the age profile of the
fitted wage rates used in constructing Y (full income), multiplied
by 2000 hours per year, assumed retirement at age 65, and calculated
the implied actuarial present value of social security benefits in
1969 using the 1969 law and information about the ages of the
spouse and children (if any). However, if the individual had
insufficient quarters of coverage to receive benefits according
to his social security record, we set SSW=O. In addition, if
the reported earnings on the social security record in any year
the individual worked were below 40% of our forecasted earnings,
we assumed that the individual's main job in that year was not
covered by social security, and set that year's earnings to
zero when calculating SSW.39.
for this, both the intercept and slope of the reservation wage-
age profile were allowed to differ between blue and white collar
employment by entering the following two variables:
DBC = a dummy equal to 1 for blue collar workers (occupation
groups 3 and 4)
AGEBC = the same age/blue collar interaction used in the
market wage equation.
The estimates contradicted our expectations. Apparently,
,blue-collar workers have lower, and more slowly growing,
reservation wages than white-collar workers. Indeed, for blue-
collar workers, reservation wages seem to rise at about 2-4·10
.per year (versus 4-6% for white-collar workers).
Health
From among the several possible health variables, we
selected only:
HCO = health is worse than others of same age.
According to the estimates, having bad health compared to others
adds about 7 '10 to the reservation wage.35
Egucation.
It has been suggested, e.g., by Mincer (1974), that people
who acquire more schooling remain in the labor force longer in
order to recoup the costs of their human investments. Our
35The dummy variable HJ (left last job for health reasons)
is conspicuous by its absence. The paltry number of wage
observation for which this dummy was "on" made it fruitless to
try t()include it in b0th the market wage equation (th~ vector X)
and the reservation wage equation (the vector Z). Our decision
to include it only in X was an arbitrary one.40.
estimate of the effect of education on the reservation wage,
which is highly significant, has the opposite sign from that
suggested by Mincer. other things (especially their market
wages) held equal, more educated people are more prone to retire,
not less.
Vintage
Another plausible taste variqble is vintage, the supposition
being that older cohorts have a stronger work ethic and hence a
lower reservation wage. We thus expect a negative coefficient
for the variable VINTAGE defined earlier, which is precisely
what the estimate shows. How~y~r, it should be noted that
VINTAGE will also pick up any systematic (linear) effects of
calend~r time, so the interpretation of the coefficient is not
entirely clear.
While the variables mentioned to this point can legitimately
be considered as potential determinants of tastes, a further set
of variables pertaining to pensions was included for rather
different reasons. The estimation technique that we used requires
that any taste differences that are impounded in the error term
vi (i.e., not controlled for by inclusion in z.) must be
1.
orthogonal to the variables included in Xi. Now, since there
are many jobs with and without pension plans, it seems likely
that workers with an unobservable "taste for retirement" around
65 will ~rt themselves into jobs with pensions. Thus the
following two variables could be highly correlated with whatever
omitted taste variables lead to a high reservation wage:41.
DP = dummy equal to 1 if the job has a pension
DP65 = dummy equal to1 if the job has a pension Sond
the worker is 65 or older.
(The latter variable allows the effect of pensions on the
reservation wage to jump at age 65--the age typically prescribed
for retirement.) Consequently, for purely econometric reasons,
we decided to include both of these variables in Z.
Only about half of all workers with pensions know what
those pensions are worth in future benefits. It is possible
that not knowing the value of one's pension (late in life) is
an indication that one does not plan to make use of it, i.e., an
indication of a low reservation wage. So we entered a variable
defined as:
GP + PP = a dummy equal to 1 if the worker has a pension,
but does not know its amount.
In the same spirit, a change from one's longest occupation
might conceivably be a signal of a desire to remain in the labor
force rather than retire. So we included the variable:
DO = a dummy equal to 1 if the current occupation differs
from the occupation of longest job.
The pension variables seem quite successful at "picking
up" a propensity to retire. According to the estimates,
individuals with pensions have a log reservation wage some .25
above that for individuals without pensions up to age 65, and
a log reservation wage about .46 higher after 65. The dummy
for not knowing the amount of pension benefits has the expected42.
sign, but a very small magnitude. The dummy variable for a
change in occupation has the anticipated effect on wR: and it
is substantial--roughly a 15 percent reduction in the reservation
wage.36
Stochastic Specification
It will be recalled that the error term in (10) was assumed
to follow:
1'). = p€. + V.
~ ~ ~
In addition, the variance of v was allowed to vary with age,
viz. :
a~ = a~ + s(AGE-6l)
_~e stochastic specification produced some striking results.
First, p = .58 indicates a substantial correlation between
the error terms in the market wage and reservation wage equations:
people with surprisingly high market wages also have surprisingly
high reservation wages. One possible explanation for this
positive correlation is that omitted variables ("ability") affect
both the market wage and lifetime income in the same direction.
Second, the variance of v is very small prior to age 62.
(For comparison, the variance of € is more than 8 times as
high.) This means that, except for differences embodied in the
36Several family status vari3bles were also included in
the equation, but are not discUYded. See Table 4.vector Z, tastes for leisure are rather uniform. However,
third, this variance grows quickly with age since the parameter
s in equation (14) is almost as large as
6. Analysis of the Retirement Decision
2
0'0 •
As should be clear from the last two sections, a number of
variables (such as age)'affect both market wages and reservation
wages. If we are to analyze the retirement decision, both effects
must be considered simultaneously. For each individual, our
estimates of the vectors Y and ~ , along with data on X.
1
and Z. and estimates of the variances of
1
€ and v, enable
us to generate an estimated probability of retirement by integrating
under the relevant normal density functions. ' In fact, there
are two different ways to generate this estimated probability,
.....
called P.
First, we can assume ignorance of the available wage rate
wi ' and forecast the probability that an individual will be
retired based just on information in X and Z .37 The
distributions of the forecasted probabilities, reported separately
for those who were actually retired and for those who were
actually working, are reported in Table 5. We find that the
37Using formula (A.2) in the appendix.44.
"goodness of fit" of the model varies substantially across age
groups.
Discrimination is really quite good for 58-61 year olds.
The vast majority is still working, and our model forecasts their
behavior extraordinarily well. For the minority of 58-61 year
olds who are retired, the model correctly retires about 60~
and incorrectly labels about 37 1cJ as still working.38 Results
are almost as good among 62-64 year olds, a group that is much
more evenly divided between retirement and work. Of those
actually retired, the model correctly classifies about 49 10 and
incorrectly classifies about 33 10 • Of those actually still
working, the model correctly classifies about 88 'fo and
misclassifies almost no one.
The model has less success, however, in capturing the
retirement decisions of those aged 65-67. While very few
retirees are 'incorrectly classified as working, many
workers are incorrectly classified as retired. We do not know
how to explain this. It is worth stressing, however, that if
our model erred by underestimating the incentives to retire
provided by the social security system, we would expect it to
"retire" too few workers over 65. In fact, it retires too many.
3SIn this sentence, and in what follows, the model is
~onsidered to classify a person as retired if it gives him a
P ~bove .6 , and to classify him as working if it gives.him
a P below .4. Persons assigned ~ values between .4 and .6
are considered to be "not classified."A . ~
a p > .6 for retirees or P < .4 for workers.
b ~
•.4 $. P $. .6.
A - ~
c p < .4 for retirees or P > .6 for workers.46.
Thus whatever weaknesses remain in the model, its treatment of
social security does not seem to be one of them.
A second forecasting method is available for those who
actually chose to work. Since we know the wage (and hence the
value of Ei) for these men, we can forecast the probability
that these individuals would indeed choose to work, conditional
on this value of E•• 39
1.. The resulting probabilities are
reported in Table 6.
Comparing these results to the righthand panel of Table 5,
we see that knowledge of the wage leads to minor improvements
in our (already very good) ability to predict the behavior of
those between the ages of 58 and 64. Misclassifications are
almost entirely eliminated. Forecasting improvements are much
greater for those aged 65-67, but we still do not do very well.
How sensitive is the probability of retirement to changes
in any of the determinants of market wages or reservation wages
(the elements of X and Z)? To answer this, we first computed
the retirement probability (assuming ignorance of the true market
wage) of a "typical" member of our sample, -whom we call the
40 "base case.~ For such a typical individual, the estimated
39 Using the first term in equation (A.4) in the appendix.
40He is 62 years old, married, has 12 ¥ea:s of education,
is in the youngest vintage (born in 1911), ~s ~n good health,
has no pension, has 24 ¥ears on his present job and 20 years
of previous experience (j=24, x=20), is currently a salesman
or a clerical worker and has not changed occupation, had a non-
farm father, had lifetime full income in 1969 dollars of %373,250,
the average in the sample for that occupation, and. had an SSW!Y
ratio of .0726, the overall average in the sample..TABLE·.6·
Distribution of Estimated Probabilities
'of Being Retired (p), Assuming Known Wage
(in percent)
People Actually Working .
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probability of being retired is only .187. Table 7 shows how
this estimated probability varies as a number of these
characteristics change! Reading across any line shows the
pattern of retirement probabilities by age, and comparing any
of lines 2 through 11 with line 1 shows the effect of various
deviations from the base case.
Given our estimated effects of aging on market and
. .... . 41
reservat~on wages, the age pattern of ret~rement probab~l~t~es
begins very low at age 58 in the base case (about 4 percent),
rises slowly until age 61, and then rises more quickly thereafter.
It makes a substantial jump (from .34 to .48) at age 65, and
reaches .62 by age 67. This general age profile is pretty
typical of all the cases considered in Table 7, though they
differ~n details.
Poor health (line 2) noticeably increases the probability
-
of being retired--by an amount ranging between 10 and 18 percent,
. 42
depend~ng on age.
In line.. 3, we increment the ratio SSw/y by .01. As noted
earlier, this is a substantial change that has little effect on
41
In this experiment, j varies with age and x is held
constant.
42
In line 2, the individual is assumed to have a short-term
(not a long-term) health problem and to be in poor health
compared to others of the same age. Those who report that they
"left last job for health reasons" are assigned retirement
probabilities of .99 or more at any age by the model.TABLE 7
Estimated Retirement Pr~b3bi1ities
Ace
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the reservation wage. Not surprisingly, retirement probabilities
increase by miniscule amounts.
The vintage effect on retirement is moderate (see row 4).
As compared with men born in 1911 (the base case), men born in
1906 are 2-8 percent less likely to be retired, depending on age.
Differences among occupation groups are also very small.
In fact, retirement probabi~ities among farmers and unskilled
blue-collar workers (group 4) are virtually identical to those
of sales and clerical workers (group 2). Professional workers
and managers have the lowest retirement probabilities, and
skilled blue-collar workers have the next lowest.
As can be seen in row 8, workers with pensions are no more
likely to retire than workers without pensions up to age 64.
However, at age 65, when the retirement probability for workers
witliout pensiqns jumps by .15, that for workers with pensions
ju~ps by .35. The retirement pattern for workers with pension
plans ~nd mandatory retirement (at age 65) is qualitatively
similar to this, but quantitatively different. The jump in
the retirement probability at age 65 is .41.
Finally, lines 10 and 11 show the extreme sensitivity of
retirement decisions to wage rates. In line 10, the log wage
is increased by 50 percent (which adds 40.5% to the market
wage). This makes retirement extremely unlikely up to age 63
or 64, and leaves the probability as low as .28 even at ,age 67.
In line 11, the log wage is reduced by 50 percent (this lowers
the market wage by 69 «to), which raises retirement probabilities
very dramatically, especially at younger ages.51.
Lines 12 and 13 show two rather different types of retire-
ment" profiles. Holding age constant at 62, line 12 indicates
how the probability of being retired varies with years of
education.43 It can be seen that the probability rises slowly
up to 10 years of schooling, and then falls. College graduates
are only half as likely to be retired at age 62 as are high
school graduates. In line 13 we seethe effect that exchanging
previous experience for job tenure has on the market wage:
as j rises and x falls, the probability of retirement drops.
Workers with long job tenure are therefore much less likely to
retire than those with short job tenure.
20 Conclusion
This has been a long paper, and many interesting results
have been pointed out along the way. Rather than try to catalog
these, let us close by addressing the questions posed at the
mtset of the paper:
First; why do people retire1
1) It is clear that age has a dramatic effect, both because
age affects wages and because age affects labor-leisure tastes
(reservation wages). In our base case,the probability of
retirement increases from below 10 percent at age 61 to above
43 In this experiment x and j both adjust to the change
in years of education, with the difference j-x held constant.\
52.
60 percent by age 67.
2) If we put aside people who say they left their last
job for health reasons _(w~o may be using this to rationalize a
decision made on other grounds), poor health seems to be a
moderately important cause of retirement.
}) Pension plans--with or without associated mandatory
retirement provisions--provide powerful incentives to retire
at the age of eligibility for the pension (normally 65). Social
security, however, has a much weaker effect (if any) on retirement
decisions.
4) Retirement decisions are highly sensitive to market
wages. For this reason, few people will voluntarily change
jobs late in life if that job transition implies a substantial
reduct-ion in wages (as it normally does). Similarly, individuals
forced to leave their main j9bs because of mandatory retirement
normally will retire rather than take a new job at a lower wage.
While one must exercise extreme caution in drawing time
series inferences from cross-sectional data, the following
tentative explanation for the trend toward retirement is suggested.
1. Wages late in life may have declined relative to wages
earlier in life, thus inducing more men to retire.
2. Private pensions have expanded rapidly. These plans
typically provide strong incentives to leave the job, often even
mandating it. The resulting drop~in market wages normally is
severe enough to induce complete withdrawal fJ:.om ·~the labor force.3. Younger cohorts seem to have a stronger taste for
leisure, perhaps due to growth in the economy, causing them to
retire earlier.
4. It seems unlikely that the growth of the social
security system, as impressive as it has been, has contributed
much to the trend toward retirement.
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Since the market wage and reservation wage equations are
respectively:
10gw. = f(X.,~) + e.
1. 1. 1.
R logw. = Z.Y + T}. ,
1. 1. . 1.
and since the two errors are related by:
T}i = pei + vi'




Letting and denote the variances of € and v respectively,
this can be rewritten:
(l-p)-=.-v. -1. 1.
-------- 1 2 2 2 --. [(1-p) 0 +0 ] 2 e v
(A.l)
The left hand side of (A.:.1} is a unit normal deviate, so the












where e(·) is the cumulative unit normal. The portion of the
log likelihood function contributed by the retired people is thus:
CA.:;)
where the sum runs over the observations for retirees.
The' contribution to the likelihood from each working person is
more complex since it is the ioint probability of (a) being at work
and (b) having a wage wi' and these are nq~ independent events.
1
Prob(wage=w. and working) = l.--
= prob(workinglwage:wi) x prob{wage~Ni)
= Prob(logw. > Z.Y + pE. + v. \wage:w.) x Prob(€.=logw.-f(X~:6»
]. 1. 1_ -~ l. l. 1. ~
by .( 1), (~i?-); and (A..J:}:
= prob[(l-p)logwi + ~f(Xi;p) - Zi'Y > Vi] x prob(€i=lO~li-f(Xi'~»
by (1) since v is independent of lO~Ni;
( 1-p ) logw. +pf ( ~{ .; S) - Z. Y v.
= Prob [ l.]' l. > _!.] x Prob( E.=logw . - f (Xl.', 6 ) )
O'v 0v 1. 1. .
I! .
- ,
(l-p)logw.+pf(X.,S)-z.y~ = ~J ].]. 1. ~~ .- "I' I"L a· . v _
I 109\v~ -f(X. i ~)




Here "Prob wage=W.)1I is heuristic notation for the height -:6f
the density function af E, = lo~w.-f(X 0)
l. J 1 i)~·;."
'."here 4> is a. standard -norma~ density function.
The. contribution to the log likelihood function of all working
pe091e is thus:
{
- logw. -f(X. ~~
L log eP [ ~- ,l.. J.
ieW -. ae
. ,. ..
T:te ~verall log likelihood function is the sum of (A.,) and CA.5),
anq it is maximized w~th ,respect to, c,~ Y, p, a€ and a • .:3 -._.
In addition, 2 av was assumed to be given by:
_ a; = a~ + s(AGE-61) ,
so av actually contains two parameters. Given 31 components of
~ and 20 components of Y ,·there are 55 parameters in all.
(A.6)